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Abstract 
 
The aim of the project is to establish the effect of the procedure of co-decision to the behaviour 
of and relationship between the political groups of the Parliament and furthermore discuss the 
effect to the inter-institutional operating of the Parliament within the process of decision-making 
with the Council and Commission. The effect is established by the application of the theory of 
rational choice institutionalism where after the main theoretical interpretations are discussed to 
the empirical research of the intra-institutional process of decision-making in the Parliament. A 
main theoretical interpretation is that the formal structures of the procedure of co-decision 
favour the larger political parties due to the ability of the parties to influence the institutional 
structure of the procedure. It is however found that the procedure in reality does not favour the 
larger political parties as much as expected. The tradition of balancing the distribution of rights 
and powers according to the size of the parties and the further construction of the Conciliation 
committee system to ensure that the delegation of chairs of committees can not be made used of 
to ensure more inter-institutional influence reflect this. Yet, the procedure is interpreted to affect 
the behaviour of the political groups as to enhance cooperating instead of competition. The 
Parliament has fought hard for its current legislative status and it is interpreted that it is not 
viable that the political parties will act as to jeopardize the legislative status. However, when 
focusing on the formal rules of voting, the procedure of co-decision does not affect the political 
parties differently. The empirical research supports the later interpretation of the effect of the 
procedure to the behaviour of and relationship between the political parties. However, the 
overall pattern is that to understand the political behaviour one needs to include several 
parameters and not only the formal and informal inter- and intra-institutional practises within 
the procedure of co-decision. Such parameters are for instance the public opinion, ideological 
similarity and technical reasons.  
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1. Introduction  
 
This report emphasises the effect of the legislative procedure of co-decision of the European 
Union to the behaviour of and relationship between the political parties of the European 
Parliament. More distinctively the formal inter- and intra-institutional rules and the informal 
inter-institutional practises of the procedure are analysed as to how they affect the behaviour of 
and relationship between the political groups and in turn the inter-institutional positioning of the 
Parliament.  
 
1.1 The evolution of the procedure of co-decision 
The European Parliament has evolved greatly over the last quarter of a century. The 
introduction and the later reform of the legislative procedure of co-decision is the most 
dominant factor of evolution and has granted the Parliament equal legislative rights with the 
Council (Lindberg, 2008: 162; Kreppel, 2002: 52). Under the procedures of cooperation and 
consultation the Parliament can only affect the legislative outcomes if the Commission in the 
former and either the Council or the Commission in the later decides to incorporate the 
Parliaments proposals into the legislation (Kreppel, 2002: 84). The co-decision procedure 
differs within two key aspects: the Parliament has now the ability to veto legislation if it is not 
satisfied with the final draft and secondly the role of the Commission is diminished to the 
advance of a greater cooperation between the Council and the Parliament (Kreppel, 2002: 83)  
 
Besides empowering the Parliament the procedure of co-decision has extended the formal 
process of decision-making by establishing the Conciliation Committee. The committee is 
instituted if the Parliament and the Council have not come to an agreement within the two first 
readings of the procedure (Benedetto 2005: 69-70). To avoid the costs and delays of the formal 
conciliation the Parliament, the Council and the Commission engage in informal negotiations 
(Benedetto 2005: 70). The system of negotiations has developed outside the Treaties. 
Representatives of the Parliament, Council and Commission meet outside the Conciliation 
Committee and at an early stage of decision-making to negotiate for a common agreement 
(Benedetto 2005: 70).  
Extensive literature address the ability of the Parliament to influence the legislative outcomes 
and scholars have analysed the procedure by for instance concentrating on the Conciliation 
Committee, the internal rules of the Parliament as well as by challenging the assumption of a 
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decrease of influence with the reformation of the procedure (Benedetto 2008: 69).
1
 The dynamic 
between the formal and informal practises of the procedure as well as the effect of the informal 
bargaining is further addressed and it is argued that the informal negotiations are of great 
importance in deciding the level of legislative influence of the institutions (Farrell & Héritier 
2003: 577; Benedetto 2005: 70; Häge & Kaeding 2007: 342). The formal process of decision-
making has thus been complemented with informal practises. These have over time has become 
institutionalized (Shackleton 2000 in Häge & Kaeding 2007: 344). Hence, decisions under the 
procedure of co-decision sometimes follow the sequence outlined in the Treaty, whilst the 
decisions at other times may be adopted already in the first or second reading after an agreement 
by informal bargaining has been reached (Häge & Kaeding, 2007: 340-342). The informal 
bargaining does however, according to Häge and Kaeding, have important consequences and the 
scholars argue that the informal bargaining decreases the legitimacy of the Parliament by 
lessening the openness of the proceedings (2007: 358).  
 
The introduced literature all address the procedure of co-decision inter-institutionally and hence 
discuss the level of influence of the Council, the Commission and the Parliament within the 
legislative procedure. Still one may argue that the research is flawed due to the lack of intra-
institutional perspective. It seems plausible that the practises of the procedure also affect the 
behaviour of and relationship between the political parties of the Parliament, which in turn 
affect the positioning of the Parliament within the inter-institutional decision-making. Hence, 
the inter-institutional level of influence of the Parliament may be affected by intra-institutional 
behaviour and relations, which thus also is central to the analysis of the inter-institutional 
legislative influence of the Parliament. In the following the theory of causal mechanisms of 
interaction is applied to the procedure of co-decision to illustrate and support the argument.  
 
1.2 The theory of causal mechanisms of interactions   
The theory of causal mechanisms of interaction is based on the assumption that an international 
institution rarely will influence another institution directly without some kind of adaptation of 
preferences or behaviour by the relevant actors (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009: 129). The 
consequences of an international institution (or its decision) affecting another institution may be 
beneficial, adverse or neutral for the targeted institution. Causal influence can be transferred 
                                                 
1
 For a further introduction to the literature addressing the influence of the Parliament see Benedetto 2005 
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from one institution to another by components of causal mechanisms. The source institution or 
the decision stemming from it is based on specific rules, norms, decisions or knowledge. This 
affects the micro-level actors within the source institution and changes the preferences, 
perception and behaviour of the actors. The change affects the micro-level actors within the 
target institution, which also have their preferences and behaviour changed. This will finally 
change the rules, norms, decisions and performance or effectiveness of the target institution as a 
whole (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009: 127-129). Adapting the theory to the case of the co-decision 
procedure offers an explanation to the chain of effects of the procedure of co-decision. Adapting 
the theory suggests that the procedure is a decision by the source institution, which in this case 
may be understood as the EU, and the first affect of the procedure is thus to the inter-
institutional decision-making of the Commission, Council and Parliament (the micro-level 
actors within the source institution). The procedure will change the behaviour, perception and 
preferences of the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. This will in turn also affect the 
behaviour, perception and preferences of the intra-institutional actors (the actors within the 
target institution). The project is concerned with the Parliament and this institution is therefore 
considered next, however the Commission and Council may also be considered target 
institutions. The procedure of co-decision, introducing new formal and informal practises as 
well as enhancing the legislative influence of the Parliament, will thus change the intra-
institutional behaviour within the Parliament and this will finally also affect the behaviour and 
structure of the whole institution. The first part of the assumption is empirically backed up by 
the research of Kreppel. Kreppel argues that the acquisition of legislative power of the 
Parliament fundamentally altered the ability of the party groups to achieve their policy goals 
through direct legislative influence. She further stresses that the opportunity to impact the 
political outcomes have had a lasting influence on the internal dynamics between the party 
groups (2002: 7). Kreppel argues that the acquisition of legislative influence has impacted the 
internal dynamics between the party groups of the Parliament. Kreppel states that the 
transformation causes a consistent trend of power and influence flowing towards the control of 
the two largest party groups of the Parliament. Thus influence is transferred away from the 
smaller groups (2002: 212-219) 
 
1.3 The organization of the EP 
The situation of the party groups is not only affected inter-institutionally. The groups are further 
affected by the fact that no party group has ever held a majority of seats. Still, the two largest 
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groups, the EPP-ED and PES, are capable of controlling the majority of legislative outcomes, 
due to their size, if cooperating (2002: 8). Kreppel argues that the internal hierarchical 
organization of the Parliament is important as it reflects both the nature of the institution as well 
as the relationship between the political parties. The hierarchical organization is defined by the 
distribution of rights and powers (Kreppel 2002: 8). The distribution of rights and powers are 
naturally of great importance in order for a political group to influence the decision-making of 
the Parliament and thus to be able to influence the decision-making of the EU as a whole. 
Hausemer argues that the legislative participation of the individual MEP determines which 
opinions are represented. Legislators engage in different legislative activities and policy areas 
and the participation are thus determined by the structure of opportunities and constraints the 
Members face. Selective participation has consequences for the political representation in the 
Parliament, since the Members involved determines the values, interest and constituencies that 
the Parliament represents (Hausemer 2006: 506).  Hix et al. stress that a democratic and 
effective party system of the Parliament means that the party groups need to behave in a 
cohesive way, voting will be driven by transnational party membership instead of national 
attachment and the parties will compete for political office and in the policy process rather than 
form grand coalitions (2002: 310).  
 
1.4 The consequences of the co-decision procedure 
Politics in the Parliament is dominated by the main groups of the centre-left and centre-right 
which share almost 70 percent of the seats between them and evidence indicates that the party 
groups are willing to continue to cooperate in order to affect the legislative outcomes of the 
Union as a whole (Hix et al. 2003: 318). Such selective participation is argued to have great 
consequences for the political system of the Parliament, which instead should be driven by 
political party cohesion, transnational party voting and political competition in the policy 
process. The procedure of co-decision consists of both formal and informal practises structuring 
the behaviour of and relationship between the political parties when acting within the rules of 
the procedure. Such practises may according to the characteristics of an effective system not 
reduce competition, transnational party voting and party cohesion. To research this, and 
remembering the application of the theory of causal mechanisms of interactions, one may 
question how the inter-institutional as well as intra-institutional practises of the procedure of co-
decision affect the behaviour of and relationship between the political parties in the Parliament. 
Answering such question sheds light on the parliamentary situation of the Parliament and the 
 9 
procedure is thus considered having consequences for the internal representation and 
relationship between the political groups and inter-institutionally for the way the Parliament 
operates. Whether the assumption is correct will naturally be illustrated when analysing the 
effects of the procedure. 
 
1.5 Aim of project 
The aim of the project is to analyse and discuss the intra-institutional behaviour of and 
relationship between the party groups of the Parliament within the decision-making process of 
the procedure of co-decision. The inter- and intra-institutional rules and practises are analysed 
due to their effect to the behaviour of and relationship between the political groups of the 
Parliament. Central is the effect of the formal and informal practises of the procedure as well as 
the dynamic between them. The analysis of the effect of the procedure will establish the intra-
institutionally representation and relationship between the political groups whilst inter-
institutionally the position and behaviour of the Parliament is established. This is of importance 
in regard to establishing the full effect of the procedure of co-decision, which is considered not 
perfectly valued by a solely inter-institutional perspective.    
 
1.6 Research question 
How does the procedure of co-decision affect the behaviour of and relationship between the 
political parties of the European Parliament and how does this in turn affect the operating of 
the Parliament within the inter-institutional decision-making process of the procedure? 
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2. Theoretical clarification 
 
In answering the research question clarifications and delimitations are needed. Initially the 
research question is defined and clarified where after the questions guiding the analysis is 
introduced. Following this the strategy of the project is introduced and reflected upon leading to 
the introduction of the theoretical perspective of the project, rational choice institutionalism. 
The perspective is discussed against the theory of constructivist institutionalism to reflect upon 
delimitations of the theoretical perspective.  
 
2.1 Definition and clarification of the research question  
The aim of the project is to analyse the behaviour of and the relationship between the political 
parties of the European Parliament within the legislative procedure of co-decision. The formal 
and informal inter- and intra-institutional practises of the procedure are believed to affect the 
political parties. By affect is meant the way the practises transform or emphasise specific 
patterns of behaviour or relationship of the political parties. The behaviour of the political 
parties is understood as the activity of the political party to influence the intra- and inter-
institutional legislative outcomes. The relationship between the political parties is understood as 
the distribution of rights and powers to influence the legislative outcomes. The political parties 
may be understood as a collection of actors, however for reasons of limitations the political 
parties are in the following solely treated as unitary actors. The literature of whether the political 
parties indeed are unitary is rich and out of the scope of this project to include.
2
 The Parliament 
as a whole may further be understood as one political actor and the dilemma of the political 
parties to balance party interests to the interest of the Parliament as a whole is a focal point of 
the analysis. Overall, the project is set out to analyse the behaviour of and relationship between 
the political parties and the basic definition of an actor is in the following hence a political 
party.  
 
The project is limited from analysing how the interest of the public may affect the political 
parties. The theoretical interpretations of the political behaviour and the relationship between 
the parties are in chapter six empirically challenged and within this the limitation of the interest 
of the public will herein be included. The project is further limited from analysing how the 
                                                 
2
 For an analysis of the party organization of the Parliament see Hix, Kreppel, and Noury 2003 
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effect of the procedure to the behaviour and relationship affects the legitimacy of the procedure. 
Analysing the level of legitimacy of the Parliament in the light of the theoretical interpretation 
would be of interest and further test the relevancy of the theoretical interpretations, however due 
to limitations this is out of the scope of the project.  
 
2.2 Research-questions 
In order to compose an overview of the project, the research question is divided into the 
following sub-questions that are encompassed in the analysis and will guide this. The following 
questions are theoretically answered by the application of the theory of rational choice 
institutionalism. The theoretical choice is later introduced.    
 
1. Are the formal practises created to the advantage of the larger political parties? 
2. Does the interest of the Parliament as a whole affect the relationship and behaviour of 
the political parties within the formal practises? 
3. Does the procedure of co-decision affect the parties differently than other legislative 
procedures? 
4. Do the informal practises affect the behaviour of and relationship between the political 
parties differently than the formal practises? 
5. How does the dynamic between the formal and informal practises affect the political 
parties? 
6. To what degree has the intra-institutional effect of the procedure of co-decision 
consequences for the ability of the Parliament as whole to affect the inter-institutional 
decision-making under the procedure? 
 
2.3 The strategy – reflections of the theoretical perspective 
The research questions are analysed by the application of the theory of rational choice 
institutionalism. In the following the limitations of a theoretical strategy is discussed.  
  
The project is set out to investigate the intra-institutional effects of the procedure of co-decision 
by developing theoretical interpretations of the behaviour of and relationship between the 
political groups of the Parliament. Utilized literature is of both a primary and secondary character 
and is a collection of research of the procedure of co-decision and the present and former 
Parliament. If the project was to rely on information solely of the latest Parliament it had been 
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necessary to collect much of this information oneself. One could have established quantitative as 
well as qualitative investigations and by such also establish further insights to the behaviour of 
the political parties, especially when concerned with the informal practises which are more 
obscure than the formal. One could also have collected the roll-call votes of the latest Parliament 
and by such empirically establish the level of competition between the political parties within the 
procedure of co-decision. None of these strategies were chosen and a critique may hence be that 
the literature is outdated and the theoretical interpretations therefore lack intensity in explaining 
the behaviour of and relationship between the political parties.  The opposing argument is that 
even though the practises of the procedure are not static they are institutionalized and whilst the 
formal practises the latest have been reformed by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Benedetto 2005: 67) 
the informal practises have also been institutionalized (Shackleton 2000 in Häge & Kaeding 
2007: 344). Therefore, the practises seem not to have been changed much within the former and 
present Parliament and the literature is therefore current. When testing the theoretical 
interpretations, it would however have been an advantage to test the interpretations to the latest 
empirical material, however given limitations of the project and further the limitations of the 
literature, this has not been possible. Instead the interpretations are empirical tested to both the 
research of the present and former Parliaments.       
 
2.4 Choosing a theoretical framework 
To analyse the behaviour of and relationship between the political parties of the Parliament the 
theory of rational choice institutionalism is chosen as the single theoretical perspective. The 
theory of causal mechanisms of interaction was in the introduction utilized to illustrate the effect 
of the procedure of co-decision. It was argued that the procedure affected not only the behaviour 
of the relevant actors, but also the preferences and perceptions of such. Choosing the theory of 
rational choice institutionalism influences this understanding and the chain of effects is hence 
solely recognized as to affect the behaviour of the political parties and thus not to change the 
preferences and perceptions.    
 
According to Steinmo, the goal of scholars of rational choice institutionalism is to uncover the 
laws of political behaviour and actions based on the belief that when these laws are uncovered 
one can construct models that will predict political behaviour (2001: 562). Rationalists work 
deductive, hence the scholars look to the real world to test the model rather than to look at the 
real world and search for models that will explain the phenomenon they observes (Steinmo 
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2001: 562). The aim of the project is to theoretically develop interpretations to the behaviour of 
and relationship between the political parties within the procedure of co-decision and the theory 
of rational choice institutionalism is a natural methodological match. The reason for the 
deductive approach is to set the empirical research a side and thus not get lost in the massive 
empirical research suggesting different patterns of behaviour and relationship between the 
parties. The ability of the theory of rational choice to explain the behaviour of and relationship 
between the political parties is in chapter six empirically assessed. However, the main focus of 
the project is on the development of theoretical interpretations of the behaviour and relationship 
and chapter six will only briefly introduce the empirical research challenging or supporting the 
theoretical interpretations.  
Rather than developing the theoretical assumptions of rational choice at length, the project takes 
point of departure in the key assumptions of the theory. Thus, the variation within the rational 
choice scholarship is not included, which may be a further critique of the theoretical strategy. 
The advantage of applying the theory in its simplest and starkest form is according to Kreppel 
and Hix, that once one have judged the influence of the crudest variant of the theory one can 
make a judgment about whether it is necessary to include further levels of theoretical 
sophistication for a fuller explanation (Kreppel & Hix, 2003: 79).  
 
The choice of the theory of rational choice institutionalism has naturally meant that other 
theories have been deselected. In the following the theory of constructivism institutionalism is 
introduced and the application of the theory to the aim of the project is discussed. The aim is to 
understand the limitations of the theory of rational choice institutionalism.  
 
2.5 Rational choice institutionalism 
Rational choice institutionalism is focused on how institutions (understood as collective norms, 
rules and procedures) regulate or constrain behaviour by altering the cost-benefit calculations of 
rational actors (Sangiovanni 2006: 393). Rational choice institutionalists view actors as 
instrumentally rational, unitary actors who have created the institutional framework because 
they benefit from the functions performed by them. Institutions reduce transaction costs, solve 
problems of incomplete contracting, enforcement and monitoring. Preferences of the actors are 
not affected by the institutions – instead the institutions provide constraints and opportunities 
for the strategic actors to reach their goals – thus they do not shape the goals (Sangiovanni 
2006: 195). For the project rational choice offers a framework for analysing the effects of the 
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procedure of co-decision from the assumption that the all actors seek to maximise their 
influence over policy outcomes. This is done from two very different perspectives: On one side, 
the project will adopt the assumption that the rules and instititutional setting guiding the 
behaviour of the political parties are complete and thus fully will be able to explain the 
behaviour of actors. On the other side it is assumed that the rules governing the behaviour and 
interaction of the actors are incomplete and the assumption is utilized as to include the informal 
practises of the procedure of co-decision as to how such affect the behaviour of and relationship 
between the political parties.   
 
2.5.1 Constructivism institutionalism 
Constructivists point in contrast to rational choice institutionalists to subjective and inter-
subjective beliefs. These beliefs include norms, identities and cultures as important causes to 
political outcomes. According to constructivists political actors do not always make decisions 
by a simple cost-benefit analysis, based on individual utility or material benefit: instead actors 
follow socially defined rules and norms – even when doing so the actors may be go against their 
own self-interest. Hence, the focal point of constructivists is on the social construction of 
collective rules and norms that guide political behaviour. (Sangiovanni 2006: 393-395).  For the 
analysis the constructivist perspective could be utilized to discuss the formal and informal 
practises as having changed the very identities and self-images of the actors in comparison with 
other procedures. The ability of the Parliament to influence legislative outcome could hence 
have been discussed and analysed as to whether there are signs indicating that the preferences of 
the actors have changed.  Sangiovanni indeed argues that a central critique of the theory of 
rational choice institutionalism is the inability to accommodate changes of preferences that 
occur during bargaining (Sangiovanni 2006: 197). The application of the theory of 
constructivism institutionalism could thus have affected the analysis as to include that the 
interaction between the political parties, the institution in which they operate and the legislative 
influence of the Parliament as a whole could be understood as not only changing the incentives 
of the actors, as the theory of rational choice depends on, but the very identities. The application 
of the theory of rational choice and the following empirical testing has shown the limitations of 
the theory and especially the structure of the Parliament is difficult to explain by the application 
of rational choice institutionalism. Constructivism institutionalism could here help explain the 
traditional structuring by developing arguments of identity, which could be of interests in the 
case of the Parliament. However, the theory of constructivism has also limitations and one may 
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be that the transnational structure could limit the understanding and one would get lost in 
discussing transnational interests contra national interests of the Members of the Parliament.  
 16 
3. The party system of the European Parliament 
 
In the following the party system and the political groups of the Parliament are introduced. 
Introducing the entire history and evolution of the party system is out of the scope of this project 
and the focal point is thus on the current structure of the party system and the existing party 
groups of the Parliament.
3
 
 
3.1 The political system 
The European Union is institutionally a system of separated powers. The executive, the 
Commission, does not require the support of a majority in the Parliament to be able to govern 
and in turn the Commission can not dissolve the Parliament (Hix et al. 2005: 212). However, 
even within a system of separated powers the structure of incentives can, according to Hix et al. 
lead to string legislative power systems. This can reduce the transaction costs of coalition-
formation (2005: 212). A central element of an effective party system is thus the organization of 
political groups whilst a further element is competition. A party system consisting of 
underdeveloped organizations or based on colluding instead of competing organizations does 
not fulfil the central features of a democratic political system (Hix et al 2003: 309). As 
introduced in chapter one, Hix et al. argue that a democratic and effective party system of the 
Parliament will contain cohesive party groups, transnational voting and competition for political 
office along a left-right line (Hix et al. 2003: 210).  The party system of the Parliament has since 
the first direct election undergone several changes and only three of the original parties still 
exist: the PES, The EPP and the ELDR. Change in composition of the party groups occurs both 
at election time as well as during parliamentary term (Bardi 2002: 74). Bardi argues that this 
indicates that inter-group dynamics may be at least as important as elections in determining the 
composition of the Parliament (2002: 74). Political parties are present at the EU level in two 
different types of structures. Transnational party groups consist of Members from all or most of 
the Member States and are according to Bardi connected to the three transnational party 
federations; the EPP-ED, PES and ELDR. Multiparty groups are a less stable category. The 
groups normally have fewer national components than transnational party groups (Bardi 2002: 
74). 
                                                 
3
 For a further introduction to the political system and the political groups of the Parliament see Judge & Earnshaw 
2003 and Corbett et. al. 2005 
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3.2 The role of the political parties 
Judge and Earnshaw define the role of political parties as linking the people to the decision-
makers as well as linking structures and interactions between the decision-makers themselves. 
The scholars argue that the role of the political parties of the Parliament is not any different 
from national parliaments and legislatures: the political parties provides for the easiest and most 
effective operation of the institution (2003: 117). Judge and Earnshaw argue that the 
organization and role of the party groups are affected by the structure of the legislative 
procedures and they stress the importance of the legislative procedures to the Parliament, which 
according to them require fluid parliamentary majorities across policy areas as well as 
legislatives procedures. The scholars‟ further stress that since the Parliament needs to engage in 
inter-institutional bargaining with other institutions it must be able to accommodate and express 
both national and transnational demands (2003: 117). The definition of the role of the political 
parties offered by Judge and Earnshaw provide the basis understanding in answering the 
research question: the procedure of co-decision affects the relationship between the political 
parties because of its specific intra-institutional set of rules as well as affecting the Parliament 
through setting rules and structures for the inter-institutional decision-making to which the 
Parliament must respond.  
 
3.3 The composition of the sixth European Parliament 
When the first Parliament was directly elected in 1979 there was 410 Members from 10 
European Member States and 51 different national political parties. Today the Parliament 
consists of 785 Members from 27 Member States and over 170 national political parties (Hix et 
al. 2009: 821). The Members are elected every five year on a basis of proportional 
representation
4
 and are organized into political groups (Wallace et al. 2005: 65).  The groups 
were formally established in 1953 by the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (Corbett et al. 2005: 71-72). As a result of procedures of group formation, the 
enlargement and national elections the numbers of party groups have changed over time 
(Corbett et al. 2005: 71-75).  
 
                                                 
4
 For more information of the proportional representation and the procedures of the elections see Corbett, Jacobs & 
Shackleton 2002 
 18 
The sixth European Parliament was elected in 2004 and stands at the threshold of a re-election. 
It consists of seven party groups containing the majority of the Members of the Parliament. The 
largest group is the European Peoples Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED) with 288 
Members. The Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PES) are the second largest 
consisting of 217 members. The Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
has 100 members. Hence the three largest groups contain the majority of Members, leaving four 
minor groups sharing no more than 150 Members between them. The Union for Europe of 
Nations (UEN) has 44 members, Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (The 
Greens/EFA) has 43 members and Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic 
Green Left (GUE/NGL) has 41 Members whilst the smallest group, the 
Independence/Democracy Group (iD) has 22 members. 755 Members of the Parliament are thus 
organized in political groups (The European Parliament 2009)  
 
3.4 Securing majorities 
In the aftermath of each European election much attention has been paid to whether the 
Parliament has a left of centre or right of centre majority (Corbett et. al 2005: 105). No single 
party currently holds a majority; however Kreppel argues that it is possible to imagine both 
centre-left and centre-right coalitions between EPP-ED, Liberals and other smaller parties on 
the right-centre side as well as coalitions between PES, the Greens and other rights-wing parties. 
The effectiveness for such coalitions depends on attendance and cohesion (2002: 358). Ideology 
is thus of importance, but is arguably not as important as in national parliaments since the 
Parliament is not organized in opposition and government, the Members represent a variety of 
different national, regional and sectoral interest, which means that voting patterns are sometimes 
more related to such factors than ideological divisions and lastly since the division between 
federalists and Eurosceptics sometimes are more striking than ideological divisions (Corbett et 
al. 2005: 105).  
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4. The legislative procedure of co-decision  
 
The procedure of co-decision has granted the Parliament equal legislative rights with the 
Council. The procedure is divided into two readings of both the European Parliament and the 
Council and if the institutions at this stage have not accepted each other amendments, the 
legislative act in question is brought to a Conciliation Committee in which representatives from 
the Commission, the Parliament and the Council will negotiate for a joint text. If the 
representatives reach an agreement, the joint text has to be approved within both institutions, if 
the representatives do not reach an agreement the legislative process has come to a stop. The 
formal practises are complemented by informal practise s of bargaining between the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Council (Corbett et al. 2005: 204-206). The institutions do 
so in order to avoid the costs of the longitude of the formal practises of the procedure 
(Benedetto 2005: 70).  
 
The procedure of co-decision is the focal point of this project and is introduced in the following. 
To understand the unique character of the procedure the chapter will open with a short 
introduction to the evolution of legislative influence of the Parliament. This leads to a 
presentation to the debate of the extent of legislative influence by the Parliament. Hereafter the 
focus is turned to the inter-institutional formal as well as informal practises of the procedure of 
co-decision. Farell and Héritier include informal institutions when discussing the balance of 
power between the Council and the Parliament in the legislative procedure of co-decision. The 
scholars argue that the dynamic interaction between formal and informal institutions has 
important consequences for both the legislative outcomes and the relative decision-making 
power of the political actors at the European stage (2003: 578). Thus, to fully capture the extent 
of the inter-institutional decision-making process of co-decision, the informal bargaining 
between the institutions are also introduced. Lastly the intra-institutional formal procedures 
structuring the decision-making within the Parliament are established.   
 
4.1 The legislative influence of the Parliament 
The Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament have each a distinct 
role in the legislative decision-making process of the EU. The Commission holds the right to 
initiate the legislative proposals whilst the Council holds the rights to amend and approve the 
proposals of the Commission. Depending on the policy area in question the Parliament holds 
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equal rights with the Council. By this mean the Parliament and the Council hold the legislative 
authority of the EU. The formal rules of interaction between the three institutions are specified 
in the different legislative procedures (Thomsen & Hosli 2006: 392). Today the procedure of 
co-decision is the most common utilized procedure (Neuhold & Settembri 2009: 128).  
Before the Single European Act of 1987 the Council was only obliged to listen to, and thus not 
legally obliged to include, the opinion of the Parliament to its amendments to the proposals of 
the Commission (Kasack 2004: 242). This changed with the Act, which introduced the 
procedures of cooperation and assent to the existing procedure of consultation. The procedures 
incorporated the Parliament into the decision-making process of the Union. The authority was 
however limited and only allowed the Parliament to propose amendments to the Council as well 
as consider vetoing the final proposal of the Council. The Parliament was not an equal legislator 
and even though the Parliament in the cooperation procedure was granted the right to veto, the 
Council could override this by a unanimous vote (Steunenberg & Thomassen 2002: 2). Under 
the consultation and cooperation procedure the Parliament is only capable of affecting the 
legislative outcomes if either the Commission or the Council in the former and the Commission 
in the latter decide to incorporate the Parliaments proposals into the legislation (Kreppel 2002: 
84). The Treaty of Maastricht, which came into affect in 1993, introduced the legislative 
procedure of co-decision. The procedure established the Conciliation committee, which is 
institutionalized in times of disagreement between the Parliament and the Council. 
Representatives from the two institutions bargain for compromises; however the initial 
procedure of the Treaty of Maastricht allowed the Council to reintroduce its initial proposal if 
the representatives were not able to agree on a joint text.  The Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
entered into force in 1997, ratified this imbalance between the Council and the Parliament. The 
co-decision procedure was reformed and the Council lost the ability to re-introduce its initial 
proposal 
5
 (Steunenberg 2002: 163). With the Treaty of Amsterdam all legal bases under the 
cooperation procedure, which had played an important part in the development of the legal 
powers of the Parliament, were transferred to the procedure of co-decision with the exception of 
four. The Treaty of Nice maintained these exceptions. In regard to the co-decision procedure the 
Treaty only marginally widened the scope of the procedure (Corbett et al. 2005: 204-206).  
 
4.2 Debating the influence of the Parliament 
                                                 
5
 For a more thoroughly introduction to the legislative evolution of the Parliament see for instance Corbett al.  2005 
or Judge & Earnshaw 2003 
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As introduced the procedure of co-decision was established by the Treaty of Maastricht and 
reformed by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Today the co-decision procedure is the most common 
utilized procedure and the earlier much more used cooperation procedure has been set aside for 
the co-decision procedure (Settembri & Neuhold 2009: 128). The introduction of the co-
decision procedure means that the Council no longer can overrule the rejection of the Parliament 
by adopting a particular proposal unanimously; however whether or not this in practise has 
indeed increased the powers of the Parliament is contested (Settembri & Neuhold 2009: 128). 
Settembri and Neuhold introduce to this literature and highlight that against the opinion of a 
vast majority of scholars, Tsebelis and Garrett (2002) argue that the Parliament was more 
powerful under the cooperation procedure than under the early co-decision procedure. The 
scholars alter their opinion with the reformation of the procedure; however Burns (2006) on the 
other hand challenges such alteration and argues that the Parliament is potentially weaker under 
the later procedure of co-decision (Settembri & Neuhold 2009: 128-129) 
6
. 
 
4.3 The inter-institutional structure of the co-decision procedure 
Within the procedure of co-decision legislation is only adopted when both the Parliament and 
the Council have approved the legislation in question. In the event of a disagreement between 
the two institutions, the Conciliation committee is institutionalized. Representatives from the 
two institutions participate and work together in formulating a joint text. The joint text has to be 
approved by both institutions for the legislative in question to be adopted (Thomsen & Hosli 
2006: 392). The procedure consists of two readings of both the Council and the Parliament, as 
well as the establishment of the Conciliation committee and furthermore another final voting in 
each institution. The many readings have resulted in an extension of the legislative process and 
to counteract this, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament engage in informal 
negotiations (Golub 1999 in Häge & Kaeding 2007: 342). Shackleton argues that the informal 
negotiations seem to have an important effect on the behaviour of the institutions as well as the 
relationship between them (Shackleton 2000 in Farell & Héritier 2003: 577). Farell and Héritier 
argue that the informal negotiations have important consequences for both the legislative 
outcomes as well as the legislative power of the European institutions. According to the 
scholars, the informal institutions may be influenced by the formal framework in which the 
                                                 
6
 Further literature has evolved debating both the struggle of the Parliament to become equal to the Council as well 
as debating whether the co-decision procedure has made the Parliament better or worse of – for an introduction see 
Steunenberg & Thomassen 2002 or Kasack 2004 
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actors operate, but the informal institutions are not determined by this. This means that it would 
be extremely difficult for the Member States to predict the outcome of the formal institutional 
framework, in this case the introduction of the informal institutions in the procedure of co-
decision (Farell & Héritier 2003: 578-580).  Shackleton and Raunio argue that the informal 
negotiations introduce an element of obscurity (2003 in Häge and Kaeding 2007: 342). For 
Benedetto, such obscurity equals a serious disadvantage for the Parliament (2005: 70). The 
secrecy of Council deliberations and the disadvantage of individual preferences of the Members 
cause the Parliament to bargain information-blind and the Parliament is thus disadvantaged in 
comparison with the Council. (2008: 70). Häge and Kaeding disagree and argue that the 
Parliament should be in a relatively good position in the inter-institutional process of informal 
bargaining: the process of informal bargaining is more efficient and allows the Parliament to 
take out more compromises from the Council than would have been the case if the decision-
making would have been handled in the Conciliation committee (Häge & Kaeding 2007: 357-
358).  
 
4.4 The intra-institutional structure of the co-decision procedure 
In Article 251 TEC the inter-institutional as well as intra-institutional rules of the procedure of 
co-decision are described. It is established that specific intra-institutional rules decide how the 
Parliament is to react when deciding to adopt, amend, or reject the act in question. In the first 
reading the Parliament can give its opinion or suggests amendments with only a simple 
majority. If the Council does not accept the amendments or decide to give its own opinion to the 
proposal of the Commission, the act is processed through a number of readings. The Parliament 
acts by an absolute majority in all of the readings (Art. 251).  An absolute majority consists of 
393 Members (Hix et. al 2003: 319). Further formal rules are described and applied to the 
following analysis, when these are of interest.  
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5. The effect of the procedure of co-decision  
 
In the following chapter the behaviour of and relationship between the political parties of the 
European Parliament in the procedure of co-decision is theoretically analysed from the 
perspective of rational choice institutionalism. The theory of rational choice institutionalism is 
based on the assumptions of interest maximising political behaviour, fixed preferences and low 
density of normative political environment. Further basic assumptions are thin socialization 
within the political environment, that consensus-based behaviour is as an obstruction for the 
every-day decision-making and additionally that actors are not obliged to justify political 
positions (Lewis 2003: 104-106). A further introduction and a reflection of the theoretical 
choice of rational choice institutionalism are found in the second chapter of the project.  
 
In the first section of this chapter the adaptation of the theoretical perspective to the case of the 
intra-institutional decision-making of the Parliament is discussed. Hereafter two theoretical 
perceptions stemming from the basis assumption of rational choice institutionalism are applied 
and the behaviour of and relationship between the political parties are analysed. The first 
perspective seeks to interpret the behaviour of and the relationship between the political parties 
within the formal practices of the procedure as layed down in the Treaties. Thus the perspective 
disregards the informal practises developed within the procedure of co-decision and assumes 
that the competencies and practises of the political actors are fully spelled out in the Treaties. 
The second perspective seeks to understand the behaviour of and relationship between the 
political parties in the Parliament under the informal procedures. The perspective is based on the 
assumption that Treaty texts are incomplete contracts and that the informal procedures have 
been institutionalized by continuing conflict over competencies. The informal bargaining 
between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament are analysed as to how it affects the 
political groups of the Parliament. Within the first perspective the behaviour of the political 
parties is analysed in relation to other legislative procedures as to reflect on change of 
behaviour. In the closing section of the chapter the dynamic between the formal and informal 
practises within the procedure of co-decision is discussed to the characteristics of an effective 
political system. 
 
5.1 Adapting the theory  
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By adopting a rational choice institutionalist point of view to the behaviour of the political 
parties of the Parliament one assumes that the political parties work to maximise their own 
interests (Lewis 2003: 102). The political parties work to maximise these interests within the 
institutional environment of the Parliament, which according to the theory of rational choice 
either constraints or facilitate the political parties (Lewis 2003: 98) and it is therefore essential 
for the further analysis to understand the institutional structure of the Parliament from the 
theoretical perspective.  
 
Shepsle argues that there from the perspective of rational choice is two ways of approaching 
institutions (2006: 24). The first approach understands institutions as exogenously determined. 
Institutions are the script that names the actors, the strategies, the sequence in which they are 
chosen, the information available and finally the outcome (Shepsle 2006: 24). The other 
perspective understands the rules of the game as provided by the actors and institutions do not 
require observance, but rather reflect the willingness of the actors to engage with each other in 
specific patterns and procedures (Shepsle 2006: 25-26). The point of the scholars arguing in 
favour of the second perspective is that actors can push for change of institutions, since 
institutions are believed to be merely a simple equilibrium of doing things (2006: 26).  
Turning to the behaviour of and the relationship between the political parties in the Parliament, 
one may argue that Kreppel bases her understanding of the Parliament in line with the second 
understanding of institutions by arguing that the political actors of the Parliament (individuals or 
groups) will seek to shape the institutions in which they work in order to maximise their own 
interests (2002: 214). By arguing such Kreppel seems to take for granted that the political 
parties are capable of changing the political environment and thus not merely are actors 
determined to participate in the game by the institution, but are actors actively shaping the rules 
guiding the institutional environment. Kreppel further stresses the importance and effect of the 
political environment and describes it as an environment where the political parties need to 
balance their own ideological interests to the consequences of an ideologically polarized 
Parliament. A polarized Parliament might easily end up adopting extreme amendments in the 
first round of a procedure, which would then be rejected by the other more moderate institutions 
of the EU. If the former winning coalition lacks the absolute majority in the second round of 
decision-making the Parliament would loose essential influence and be marginalized (Kreppel 
2000: 359).  
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From a rationalist point of view, one may argue that the political parties may only consider the 
interests of the Parliament as a whole as to whether the interest benefit their individual interests. 
This affects the behaviour of the political parties by changing their strategies. However, the 
influence of the interest of the Parliament as a whole to the behaviour of the political parties 
may from a narrow understanding of rational choice institutionalism not be considered to affect 
the political parties if the interest of the Parliament conflicts with the interest of the political 
parties. Yet, one could question if the threat of marginalization may be such a situation which 
indeed could affect the intra-institutional decision-making of the Parliament even when the 
interest of a political party conflicts with the interest of the Parliament as a whole: it does not 
seem plausible that the political parties will behave in such a way as to ensure that they loose 
the newly gained influence over the political outcomes. Still according to the theory one may 
not argue that the interest of the Parliament as a whole will affect and change the norms and 
rules of the political environment, which will change the identity of the political parties. 
However, how can one then from a theoretical point of view consider the dilemma between the 
interests of the political parties and the interest of the Parliament as a whole within the 
procedure?  
To summarise the argument so far, the political parties may compromise own interests if they by 
not doing so, jeopardize the legislative status of the Parliament within the procedure of co-
decision. From a rational choice institutionalist point of view, the legislative status may be more 
important to each political party than the amendments of a particular legislative act, and the 
political parties thus act in their own interests. The discussion is included within both 
perspectives.    
 
5.2 Rational actors and complete institutions – the first perspective  
In the following it is assumed that the political groups of the Parliament behave in accordance 
with the assumptions of rational choice institutionalism and additionally that the procedure of 
co-decision is a formal complete contract. The perspective thus ignores the effect of the 
informal practises.  
The formal characteristics of an institutional environment are by rationalists, according to 
Lewis, considered more consequential to outcomes than informal practises (Lewis 2003: 98). 
Institutional environments have constraining and enabling effects on the behaviour by altering 
the incentives of the actors; however the impact of the institutions on the identities and attitudes 
of actors is limited (Lewis 2003: 98). Turning to the formal institutions, Shepsle argues that the 
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single biggest success of rationalists is the analysis of structured institutions, which the most 
scholars in turn also have focused on. The reason for the match between structured institutions 
and rational choice institutionalism is according to Shepsle because politicians are selected in a 
relatively well-defined way, that politicians positions can be specified with some precision, that 
the possibilities for different politician behaviour is spelled out by the institutional rules and 
processes and that the rules of the structured institutions prescribe the rules for mapping 
behaviour into final results (Shepsle 2006: 28). In the following the theory is utilized to analyse 
both the inter- and intra-institutional practises of the procedure.  
 
5.2.1 The intra-institutional practises of the procedure  
The approval or rejection of amendments requires either a simple or an absolute majority. A 
simple majority is a majority of the present Members in plenum, whilst an absolute majority is a 
majority of all 785 Members of Parliament‟s, hence 393 Members (Hix et. al 2003: 319). 
According to the logic of rational choice institutionalism one may consider both majorities to be 
equal when the Parliament is to vote on questions to which the parties wish to maximise own 
interests and secure a majority. The interpretation is based on the assumption that attendance, 
when voting both by simple and absolute majority, will be high when voting on acts of 
importance.  In a situation where a party prefers status quo and the Parliament is voting by a 
simple majority, one must assume that the leaders of the party groups will ensure that the 
Members of the group are present and thus making a majority as difficult as possible. The same 
case may be different when voting by an absolute majority where the parties strategically might 
stay out of plenum, or simply just vote against the act. Hix et al. argue that when the 
requirement of the absolute majority is combined with the average level of attendance, which is 
between 65-75 per cent of Members of the Parliament, a coalition between the EPP and PES is 
the only viable way of ensuring the absolute requirements (Hix et al. 2003: 319). However, the 
intra-institutional rules may not give a comprehensive picture of the interest of the political 
parties and hence the patterns of voting in the Parliament. When analysing the incentives of 
voting of the political parties it seems essential to include reflect upon to what degree the 
interest of the Parliament as a whole affects the behaviour of the political parties within the 
procedure. This is in the following analysed.   
 
5.2.2 Political interests in the procedure of co-decision 
 27 
The procedure of co-decision has granted the Parliament equal legislative rights with the 
Council and according to the logic of rational choice institutionalism the parties will only adapt 
and compromise when it will benefit them selves. The parties therefore still act according to 
own interests and their choices are not determined but only constrained by the institutional 
environment. It seems plausible that the political parties within the procedure of co-decision 
cooperate and compromise own interests as to ensure that the Parliament as a whole is not 
marginalized. Hix et al. suggest that the EPP and PES are more likely to coalesce in the later 
rounds of the decision-making and on final votes, for the reason that competition in the earlier 
rounds allow the political groups to stake in their ideological positions for the later compromises 
without undermining the need to present a united front against the other institutions of the EU 
(Hix et al. 2003: 320).  As introduced in the third chapter the Parliament has fought hard for its 
current legislative status and it does not seem viable that the political parties will act as to 
jeopardize the legislative status, hence the answer to the second research question is that the 
interest of the Parliament as a whole is interpreted to affect the political parties. The parties may 
cooperate to ensure inter-institutional influence. However, is the situation any different under 
the procedure of co-decision in relation to the procedures of cooperation and consultation?  
 
5.2.3 The procedures of co-decision, cooperation and consultation 
Within the procedure of consultation the Council‟s opinion following the Parliament‟s opinion 
is final and the procedure thus consists of only one reading of the Parliament (Corbett et al. 
2005: 196-197). From a rationalist point of view one may argue that this affects the interest of 
the political parties greatly. The political parties have only one reading to secure their influence 
and if the political parties are interested in influencing the final outcome, the parties can-not 
afford to pursue individual interests over the interest of the Parliament as a whole, with the 
exception of when the parties prefer the status quo. In such a situation one must assume that the 
political parties will prefer no influence of the Parliament, given the Parliament only has one 
reading to ensure influence: one must assume that the more readings, the more the Parliament 
can affect the legislative act in question and hence hesitate less to compromise in the final stage 
of decision-making. Thus the one reading of the consultation procedure indicates that the 
political parties may only prefer to compromise their own interests when these are compatible 
with the interests of the Parliament as a whole. By not compromising the political parties do not 
significantly distance themselves or jeopardize any influence. Following this line of thought one 
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can argue that the later procedure of cooperation opened up for the possibility of pursuing party 
interests by adding another reading of the Parliament to the procedure. The first reading may be 
used by the political parties to maximise own interests whereas the parties in the second reading 
may reconsider the interests to the interest of influencing the final outcome. In the procedure of 
co-decision the political party groups have another reading in which to party interest and given 
that their attitudes, identities and interests according to rationalist arguments are not changed in 
the process of decision-making, the theoretical interpretation is that the political parties will 
only change their strategy when they have to balance the party interest to the interest of the 
Parliament as a whole on the threshold of entering the Conciliation Committee. The political 
parties will however herein balance the interest of the party to the Parliament as a whole and the 
interpretation and the answer of the second research question is that the political parties in 
overall will value influence higher than individual interests and set own interests a side when 
necessary. The interest of the Parliament as a whole is hence understood as affecting the 
behaviour of the political parties within the formal practises of the procedure of co-decision. 
Answering the third research question, the procedure of co-decision does not affect the political 
parties differently when focusing on the formal rules of voting. However when considering the 
affect of further readings, the theoretical interpretation is that the procedure of co-decision 
affects the parties differently than the other procedures, by ensuring that the parties both have 
readings to pursue party interests and further have readings to balance the interest of the party to 
the interest of the Parliament as a whole.         
 
5.2.4 Constructing a benefiting system  
The interests of the political groups are above considered equal and are thus not differentiated 
according to the large difference of size and composition of the political groups. However, do 
the political groups have different incentives and interests under the procedure of co-decision? 
As introduced in chapter three the political groups are divided both in terms of size, membership 
and structure. The political parties are further characterised by different positions at the division 
of left-right policies. Political actors are from the theoretical point of view, and as characterised 
by Lewis, driven by a logic of consequentiality. The actions of the actors are thus driven by a 
logic of anticipated consequences and prior preferences; compliance is hence the result of 
calculative reasoning and expected future benefits (2003: 102). Kreppel and Hix utilize the 
theory to the case of the inter-party competition in the Parliament and argue, with references to 
Krehbiel 1991 and Shepsle 1979, that inter-party coalitions may be formed by an issue-to-issue 
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basis since the political parties, in order to maximise their own interests, have an incentive to 
form coalitions with parties seeking the same interests as themselves. By cooperating the parties 
may also secure higher pay-offs than would otherwise be possible (Kreppel & Hix 2003: 80). 
The strategic cooperation is utilized by parties who are able to secure a majority and such 
parties might not only cooperate in relation to policy – the parties may also cooperate to secure 
institutional collaboration. The cooperation in such matters may be utilized to create decision-
making rules, set the agenda, or even to construct a system of committees that benefit 
themselves above other parties (Hix & Kreppel 2003: 80). With this logic one may argue that 
the larger political parties, EPP-ED and PES, are in a much more beneficial situation than the 
smaller political parties. The two largest political parties may not only work to secure a majority 
which leaves all other parties apart from the process of decision-making, the political groups 
may also have constructed the decision-making process of the procedure of co-decision as to 
best ensure their own interests .  
At first sight, the formal processes of the procedure do not seem to favour the larger political 
parties any more than other legislative procedures. The rules of majorities have not changed and 
in most decisions the political groups must muster an absolute majority. The absolute majority 
does however favour the PES and EPP-ED since the two political groups are the only ones 
capable of securing a majority when cooperating. Hix and Kreppel interpret the theory of 
rational choice to determine that political power and benefits are more important than policy 
outcomes. These are merely means to influence thus only a secondary consideration (Hix & 
Kreppel 2003: 82). By adapting the assumption to the behaviour of the political groups of the 
Parliament, Kreppel and Hix argue that the collusion between the PES and EPP-ED are to occur 
as long as it does not lead to a reduction in the overall power and influence of the institution 
they control (2003: 82). The argument is strong since it seems to explain how the political 
parties are able to cooperate even when ideologically divided. According to the scholars the 
smaller political parties do not loose out: the institutions, which are the result of the bargaining 
and cooperation between the parties who are able to secure a majority, will reduce transaction 
costs of the decision-making and allow all parties to focus on competing over policy outcomes. 
This will in general promote the collective efficiency of the parliamentary bargaining (Hix & 
Kreppel 2003: 80). Thus, the formal practise of majorities do seem to favour the larger political 
parties, however if the further formal practises also favour the larger political parties on the 
expense of the smaller political parties is yet not fully established.  
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5.2.5 Access and competition for the Conciliation Committee  
The Conciliation committee is composed of an equal number of representatives from the 
Council and the Parliament. The task of the representatives is to make a legislative deal within 
the six to eight week time span. If the representatives agree on a joint text this has to be 
approved by the Parliament and the Council (Corbett et al. 2005: 207). The Conciliation 
Committee has by such a much more specialized function than the standing committees in the 
Parliament. It becomes evolved only if the legislative matters discussed reach the third reading 
of the procedure of co-decision and in contrast to standing committees, the Conciliation 
delegation of the Parliament is formed on a case-by-case basis, with the exception of the three 
vice-presidents who are permanent members of the committee (Rasmussen 2008: 90-91) The 
rules of Procedure prescribes that the permanent vice-chairs has to represent at least two 
political groups (Rule 64 (3) RP of Parliament). The composition of the groups is decided at the 
beginning of a Parliamentary term and the composition will correspond to the political 
composition of the Parliament (Rule 64 (2) RP of Parliament; Rasmussen 2008: 90-91). There 
has been considerable discussion within the Parliament as how best to take advantage of the 
procedure of co-decision (Corbett et al. 2005: 205). Corbett et al. describes that the political 
groups have discussed whether the delegation should be decided on ad hoc basis for each 
legislative act or whether the delegation should be composed by permanent members. The result 
was a compromise between the two models and the only permanent representatives are the three 
vice-chairs. The remaining members are predominantly to be drawn from the committee which 
is responsible for the legislative act in question, which automatically include the chair and 
rapporteur of the committee. Hence, the delegation is designed as to ensure that it reflects the 
political balance in the Parliament (Corbett et al. 2005: 205). An important characteristic is that 
when the parties nominate members to the delegation within their quota, the parties are obliged 
to include the members whose presence is required. Therefore, if a party has two vice-presidents 
represented in the delegation or if a party provides the chair and rapporteur they have to subtract 
the required members from the quota of the party (Corbett et al. 2005: 215). As established 
earlier a basic rationalist argument is that the institutional structure of a system may be 
constructed as to the advantage of the political parties capable of affecting the institutional 
structure. If one adopts such argument to the representation of the political parties in the 
Conciliation committee, one may observe that the structure always will favour the larger 
political groups since the large number of Members, and thus representatives. However, the 
 31 
structure does not exclude the smaller political groups. Since the political parties have to adapt 
their quota if they have permanent members as representatives, the larger political groups can 
not take advantage of the composition of chairs and rapporteurs as well as the appointment of 
permanent vice-chairs to improve their position in the Conciliation committee. Therefore, the 
rules constructing the delegation of members to the process of bargaining do not seem to favour 
the larger political parties particularly. From a rationalist point of view one must thus assume 
that the political parties capable of affecting the institutional structure will push for change of 
the composition as to ensure more power and influence, especially if one includes the rationalist 
argument stating that influence and power are considered more important than legislative 
outcomes. According to Corbett et al. there has been attempts to modify the system towards the 
model of permanent representatives, however the present structure guaranteeing very broad 
participation in the process of conciliation have so far prevailed over other models (Corbett et 
al. 2005: 215). Thus, answering the first research-question, the theoretical interpretation is that 
the formal structures do not favour the larger political parties as much as expected. The tradition 
of balancing the distribution of rights and powers according to the size of the parties and further 
that the political parties have constructed the Conciliation committee system as to ensure that 
the intra-institutional delegation of chairs of committees can not be utilized to ensure more 
inter-institutional influence, reflect this.     
 
5.3 Rational actors and incomplete institutions – the second perspective 
The theory of rational choice institutionalism is in the following still point of departure as was 
the case above. However, whilst the first perspective was further based on the assumption of 
fully complete formal contracts, the following is based on the assumption of the incompleteness 
of formal institutions and the perspective is thus based on the assumption of informal 
institutions as introduced by Farell and Héritier (2007). The scholars argue that rationalists have 
underplayed the role of strategic informal bargaining over competencies within the EU. 
Scholars have by doing so insulated the process of institutional creation from the day-to-day 
political interactions that take place within the institutions of the EU (2007: 229). In the 
following the informal practises are further defined followed by an analysis of institutional 
constraints and facilitating factors deciding participation. Lastly the collective tradition of the 
Parliament is analysed in relation to the participation and behaviour of the political parties.   
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5.3.1 Defining informal practises  
Farell and Héritier suggest that the inter-institutional informal interactions are best treated as 
infinitely repeated games. Actors, understood as institutions, parties and individual Members, 
perceive the games to be linked with each other and hence over time the bargaining within the 
games will give rise to informal institutions. Such institutions consist of informal norms and 
procedures and may have an important impact on institutional outcomes. The informal practises 
may be affected by the formal procedures, but they are not determined by this framework (Farell 
& Héritier 2003: 580-582). Stacey et. al add that formal institutions are conscious created by 
political actors whilst informal institutions both can be intended as well as the result of 
unintended patterns that are build up by repeated interactions. The scholars further argue that 
the key distinction between formal and informal institutions is that actors engaging in the 
informal institutions are not legally bound to their rules (Stacey & Rittberger 2003: 861).  
 
5.3.2 Representing the Parliament in the informal institution  
The delegation for the informal institution is made up of the chairman of the relevant 
committee, the rapporteur and possibly shadow-rapporteurs from other political parties (2007: 
344). Within the literature of the processes of informal bargaining scholars disagree on the 
effect of the influence on the Parliament. One perspective is that the informal processes 
introduce a form of obscurity into the proceedings (Häge & Kaeding, 2007: 342). The secrecy 
of Council deliberations and the disadvantage of individual preferences of the Members of the 
Parliament position the Parliament at a disadvantage. The Parliament has to bargain 
information-blind and are thus disadvantaged in comparison with the Council (Benedetto, 2005: 
70). Shackleton disregards such argument and argue that given the Councils incentives to avoid 
conciliation, due to large opportunity costs regarding Conciliation negotiations, the Parliament 
is in a better position than the Council (Shackleton in Häge & Kaeding 2007: 342).  
 
One should from a rational choice institutionalism point of view assume that the larger political 
parties would cooperate to secure institutional collaboration, which could be utilized to create 
decision-making rules and set the agenda. Adapting the logic of the theory one should assume 
that the informal practises of the inter-institutional negotiations were structured in such a way as 
to benefit the larger political parties of the Parliament. The EPP-ED and PES are the only 
parties capable of securing a majority together and it seems theoretically plausible that the 
parties will utilize such powers and ensure negotiating within the informal practises of the 
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procedure. The two political parties could by-pass the other political parties and for instance 
secure that the time of decision-making is shortened considerably, which may be of political 
interests. However, by-passing the other political parties may also affect the intra-institutional 
structure of the Parliament and affect the strategies of the by-passed political parties in such a 
way as to change the structure of the Parliament. The by-passed political parties will act as to 
maximise their own interests and if they feel that the institutional environment constrain instead 
of facilitate them to pursue their interests, one may assume that the political parties will change 
their strategy and focus on how to create a balanced and more easily accessed informal 
institution. The situation is however quite different due to the formal and informal rules 
structuring the delegation and once again the tradition of the Parliament secures that the smaller 
political parties are: the formal rules maintain that the chairmanship and the dividing of 
rapporteurs are distributed as to reflect the balance of the Parliament. The situation challenges 
the theory of rational choice, since the logic of the individual interest-maximisation at first sight 
not seems to be fulfilled. The system should from this perspective be structured as to benefit the 
larger political parties. However, on the other hand one could theoretically also interpret the 
situation differently and argue that the structure must be for the best of the larger political 
parties, since the political parties never act against their own interests. Thus the structure is 
strategic considered and found to be for the best. The advantages of the structure could be said 
to be a balanced party, in which all parties feel that they are represented and thus will act to the 
best of the Parliament instead of focusing on re-structuring the Parliament. A further reason 
could be that the larger political parties have found that a representative Parliament is more 
influential in the inter-institutional decision-making.  
 
5.3.3 Informal intra-institutional procedures 
The argument of a collective Parliament challenges the basic foundation of rational choice 
institutionalism if one argues that the political parties act collective because of a collective will 
and thus that the interaction and decision-making within the Parliament has changed the 
preferences of actors. However, if one argues that the Parliament reflects the opinions of all 
political parties and thus that no political parties use the informal practises to by-pass other 
political parties, not because of a change of preferences or identity, but because of this benefit 
the political parties the most, one is in line with the theoretical thought of rational choice 
institutionalism. Political parties may change their strategies and compromise because this 
benefits themselves the most. It is possible that this is the case, when one takes into 
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consideration that many of the rules structuring the behaviour of the political parties are based 
to ensure the influence of all political parties. The larger political parties have a naturally 
political advantage, but the system does not benefit these parties to the full exclusion of the 
smaller political parties. The practises guiding the behaviour of the Parliament in the informal 
institutional structure could also be of such a character, given the tradition of the Parliament. 
The collective tradition is further backed up if one assumes that the representatives from the 
Council prefer to negotiate with a Parliament in consensus, since a Parliament in consensus 
might have a larger impact on the decision-making in the Council. Thus, to answer the fourth 
research question, the informal practises do not seem to favour the larger political parties in 
particular and the rules structuring the informal practises are thus equal to the formal rules of the 
procedure of co-decision. The theoretical interpretation suggesting that the rules structuring the 
informal bargaining should favour the larger political parties is thus challenged by the rules 
guiding the day-to-day decision-making of the Parliament.   
 
5.4 The dynamic between formal and informal institutions 
Above are the formal and informal procedures constraining and facilitating the behaviour of and 
relationship between the political parties of the Parliament within the procedure of co-decision 
analysed by the application of the theory of rational choice institutionalism. The formal and 
informal procedures are analysed apart and the analysis of each perspective is based on the 
assumption that the other practise does not impact the political parties. However, the procedure 
of co-decision is not based on either and some legislative acts are decided within the informal 
institutions, some are decided within the formal procedures and others are negotiated in the 
informal institutions, but continued within the formal institutional framework. Therefore, to sum 
up and analyse the arguments of both perspectives to each other, the dynamic between the 
formal and informal institutions is analysed as to how this affect the political parties of the 
Parliament.  
 
5.4.1 The effect of the dynamic to the interests of the political parties 
The dynamic between informal and formal institutions may be an advantage for the political 
parties of the Parliament. The informal practises may function as a take-it-or-leave-it stage of 
the decision-making, given the formal decision-making simply will continue if the institutions 
can not find a solution. Furthermore the political parties might be reserved and question the 
advantage of a compromise if their strategic cost-benefit calculations indicate that the outcome 
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of the formal practises may be closer to their preferences than the outcome of the informal 
negotiations. Such argument is based on the principle of equal rights for all of the parties to 
affect the legislative decision-making.  This interpretation of the theoretical perspective of 
rational choice was above analysed within both perspectives.  
 
Another argument, also interpreted by the theory of rational choice institutionalism, suggests 
that the political parties may value influence higher than political outcome. This could be of 
special importance in the dynamic between the formal and informal practises. The political 
parties might exploit the informal practises to secure influence and thus compromise to ensure 
such influence – the outcome of the further process of formal procedures is uncertain and it 
might not fall out to their advantage. Theoretically one may argue that the political parties will 
value some influence better than none. Such argument is however based on the basic 
assumption of individual interest-maximising behaviour of the political parties. Yet a large part 
of the analysis was concerned with the question of whether the interest of the political parties is 
set aside for the interest of the Parliament as a whole, and how such is explained through the 
theory of rational choice. The dilemma is further analysed in the following section.  
 
5.4.2 The effect of the dynamic to the interests of the Parliament as a whole 
The analysis of both preferences has touched upon if there is such thing as an interest of the 
Parliament as a whole. Adapting the theory of rational choice institutionalism has highlighted 
that there is no such thing as a parliamentary identity. Further, there will not appear situations in 
which the political parties will compromise own interests to the interests of the Parliament as a 
whole, if a compromise is not to the advantage of the political parties. This is the case if one 
believes the parties seek to maximise own interests, to which the political outcomes are the most 
important thing, or if one believes that the parties seek influence and power, which makes the 
political outcomes secondary. The procedure of co-decision has granted the Parliament equal 
legislative rights with the Council and one may assume that the political parties may not act as 
to jeopardize such influence. The preferences of the parties may thus be set aside to secure 
affecting the decision-making of the Union.  
  
It has been established that the formal as well as informal procedures affect the behaviour of and 
relationship between the political parties and the dynamic between them may be of special 
strategic importance to the parties. The behaviour of the political parties is determined by the 
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preferences of the parties, which according to the theory of rational choice is determined 
exogenous. The interests of the Parliament as a whole may however be set over the individual 
preferences and be to the advantage of the parties. Thus, the behaviour of the political parties in 
the procedure of co-decision is determined by on side the strategic calculations of the political 
parties, the structure of the formal and informal practises and lastly the dynamic between them, 
which may be utilized strategically by the political parties. The interpretation is that the political 
parties both are constrained and facilitated by the formal and informal structure of the procedure 
of co-decision, however especially the tradition within the Parliament to guarantee broad 
participation secures the influence of the smaller political parties. To answer the fifth research 
question, the dynamic between the formal and informal practises may affect the parties 
differently, according to the theoretical interpretation of the interests of the political parties. The 
introduction of informal practises may be utilized to pursue own ideological interests, however 
another theoretical interpretation is also that the informal practises may be utilized as to secure 
influence of the Parliament given the level of uncertainty of the further formal process. 
 
5.5 The intra-institutional effect  
A main theoretical interpretation of the theory of rational choice was that the Parliament both 
was structured as to the advantage of the larger political parties and further that the larger 
political parties would utilize their position to gain the most influence on the expense of the 
smaller political parties. It has been established that the Parliament is structured as to represent 
the political balance. The interpretation of the theory of rational choice only offers the spatial 
explanation that such balanced distribution of rights and powers must benefit the larger political 
parties the best. Adapting this argument to the inter-institutional decision-making, one may 
argue that a balanced Parliament may be stronger and more influential than a marginalized and 
conflicting Parliament. The Member States representatives of the Parliament feeling by-passed 
may affect the representatives in the Council to ensure, that a legislative act in question is not 
adopted in the Council and thus ensure that the larger political parties can not take advantage of 
their parliamentary size.  
 
The second main focal point of the analysis was the dilemma of balancing party interests to the 
interests of the Parliament as a whole. As introduced above, the Parliament may be more 
influential when in consensus than when marginalized. Influence may thus be valued higher 
than political outcome and the theoretical interpretation and the answer of the sixth research 
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question is thus that the Parliament may be stronger united than in conflict and thus that the 
larger political parties do not have an advantage in structuring the Parliament as to their 
interests. All political parties may furthermore have an advantage in securing consensus to 
ensure parliamentary influence in the inter-institutional decision-making, which may be of a 
formal character when the Council discuss adopting the amendments of the Parliament to a 
legislative act, when the Parliament and the Council negotiate for a joint text in the Conciliation 
committee and of an informal character when the Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
engage in informal bargaining. Therefore, the interpretation of rational choice institutionalism to 
the inter-institutional process of decision-making may explain what the theoretical interpretation 
of rational choice institutionalism was not capable of explaining in the intra-institutional process 
of decision-making.       
 
5.6 An effective system 
By the adaptation of the theory of rational choice institutionalism to the behaviour of and 
relationship between the political groups of the Parliament it has been possible to develop a set 
of arguments of the effect of the procedure of co-decision. A main focal was the cohesiveness of 
the Parliament as a whole. Remembering the characteristics of an effective political system, 
introduced in section 1.3 and 3.1, a cohesive Parliament may however not be characterised as an 
effective political system. It can be argued that the interest of the political parties, to ensure a 
high level of influence, conflicts with the established characteristics of an effective political 
system. The political parties should compete over political outcomes and not ensure maintaining 
legislative influence. Another related feature is that for an system to be effective the political 
parties are to compete in the policy process and if one interpret this as the political parties are to 
compete within the formal practises and hence not engage in informal bargaining (intra-
institutionally to form grand coalitions and inter-institutionally to avoid the long process of 
conciliation) the dynamic between the formal and informal practises of the procedure does not 
seem to correspond with the characteristics of an effective political system. However one may 
also argue that the balance of political representation, ensuring that the large political parties do 
not structure the decision-making to their own advantage, counteract these tendencies and 
ensure an effective and democratic political system. The characteristics determine an effective 
political system and it may be that a system can be effective with an obscure and opaque 
political system if one values the distribution of rights and powers over transparency of the 
decision-making. However, the case may also be the opposite and for the Parliament to be 
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characterised effective one may argue that it shall succeed in maintaining all of the 
characteristics.  
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6. Testing the theoretical arguments 
 
The adaptation of the theory of rational choice institutionalism to the formal and informal 
practises within the procedure of co-decision has resulted in a set of interpretations to the 
behaviour of and the relationship between the political parties of the European Parliament. A 
main focal point and theoretical discussion has been to what extent the political parties will 
work as to maximise own interest and if the quest for legislative influence of the Parliament as a 
whole affects the political groups. Utilizing the logic of the theory has indicated that the 
political parties might set own preferences a side to ensure that the Parliament does not 
jeopardize the newly gained influence: power and influence is hence the primary interest of the 
parties. In the following this argument is empirically tested.  
 
6.1 Testing the level of party competition  
Hix et al. have developed a set of propositions about the EPP-PES collusion and have tested 
these arguments in a statistical analysis of EPP-PES roll-call voting since 1979. The scholars 
conclude that the party system of the Parliament has become more competitive as the powers of 
the Parliament have increased. The party system has therefore not been weakened as the powers 
of the Parliament have increased - it has been strengthened. In the procedure of co-decision the 
party groups in the first and last reading only need to gather a simple majority to adopt 
legislation and the scholars argue that when exercising these powers, less collusion and more 
competition is to be expected. This is in line with the theoretical thoughts of the authors; with 
more at stake the party system of the Parliament is more able to structure transnational 
ideological positions and to translate these positions into competition over policy outcomes (Hix 
et al. 2003: 318-328)  
 
By the establishment of theoretical interpretations to explain and predict coalition behaviour Hix 
and Kreppel have further analyzed 420 roll-call votes from 1996 and 1999 (Hix & Kreppel: 
2003)
7
. The scholars suggest that the conflict between the PES and EPP in the after-match of the 
low turn-out of the 1999 election, which led to the alliance between the ELDR and EPP and thus 
the sharing of the seat of Presidency between the parties instead of the traditional sharing of the 
Presidency between EPP and PES, has changed the frequency of the formation of the grand 
                                                 
7
 For further information and limitations of the data see Hix & Kreppel 2003 
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coalitions (2003: 75-82). The scholars suggest that the political parties in the post 1999 
Parliament will compete more in the final stages of decision-making since continued 
cooperation would diminish the importance of the Parliament in the eyes of the public (2003: 
82) Applying the theory of rational choice institutionalism the scholars argue that the EPP and 
PES no longer should compete in the early stages of decision-making and coalesce in the final 
stages, but instead should compete in the final stages of decision-making since the individual 
interests of the parties now is to compete to secure public support (Kreppel & Hix: 2003: 82). 
Testing the theoretical suggestions to the behaviour of the political parties measured by the 
collection of roll-call-votes, the scholars find that the voting behaviour of the political parties 
both is compatible and different when comparing the results of the 1996 and 1999 roll-call 
votes. In both years the EPP and PES were more likely to form a coalition when voting on final 
resolutions or in the final stage of the decision-making, than in any other stage of decision-
making. Contrary to what was found to be the case in the 1996 Parliament, the grand coalitions 
were found less likely to be formed on internal matters in the 1999 Parliament. This suggests 
that the interpretation of rational choice institutionalism, arguing that the two parties would have 
a common interest to share the spoils of the office system of the EP in internal matters, no 
matter the concerns of the Parliament on external legislative questions to which the ideological 
division is of interest to secure public support, was incorrectly (Kreppel & Hix 2003: 91-93). 
Furthermore Kreppel and Hix find that the probability of the EPP-PES cooperation on final 
votes actually increased contrary to the prediction of the theoretical interpretation of the theory 
of rational choice institutionalism (2003: 93). This argument is supported by the study of roll-
call votes in the second reading of the procedure of co-decision conducted by Hoyland. The 
main finding is that the political parties needs to trade off left-right policy preferences against 
the need to defend the interest of the Parliament as a whole when it bargains with the Council 
(Hoyland 2006: 24). The increase of cooperation in the final stages of decision-making as well 
as the decrease in cooperation on internal issues is according to Kreppel and Hix a picture of the 
tension between being a real Parliament to the outside world and the desire to cooperate more 
vigorously when bargaining with the Commission and the Council to promote the institutional 
interests of the Parliament (2003: 94).  
Further recent empirical research suggest that the political groups of the Parliament are able to 
secure a high level of cohesiveness and furthermore that Members of the Parliament are much 
more likely to vote in terms of ideology than national affiliation (Kreppel 2000; Kreppel 2002; 
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Hix, Kreppel & Noury 2003; Hix, Noury & Roland 2005; Hix, Noury & Roland 2009). Party 
competition is constructed along a left-right dimension, in which pro and anti-integrationist 
positions provide a secondary axis of competition. The effect is according to Hix, that 
competition is structured between EPP, PES and ELDR which effectively shut out the smaller 
parties (Gabel and Hix, 2002: 953 & Hix 1999:91). Hoyland adds another secondary dimension 
in which the cohesiveness of the party groups is explained by the institutional interests of the 
main party groups to meet the absolute majority requirements in order to influence the 
legislative outcomes of the Union. However, Hoyland stresses that the empirical research of the 
individual voting of the Members of the Parliament is well explained by ideology and the 
dimension is thus secondary (Hoyland 2006: 24-26).  
 
6.2 Comparing the empirical research to the theoretical interpretations   
The interpretation of the theory of rational choice to the behaviour of and relationship between 
the political parties in the procedure of co-decision suggests that the political parties will collude 
instead of compete as not to jeopardize the legislative influence of the Parliament. The parties 
will thus collude to ensure that the Parliament is united for the inter-institutional bargaining with 
the Commission and Council – in both the formal and informal practises. The arguments of the 
empirical research introduced above to some degree support such argument, but it is important 
to acknowledge that the main finding of the scholars is that the behaviour of the political parties 
are affected by a number of variables and hence, the theoretical interpretations of political 
behaviour of the project do not fully capture the variables affecting the behaviour of and 
relationship between the political behaviour.  
The analysis of Kreppel and Hix first of all suggest that the political parties are not only affected 
by the desire to affect the inter-institutional decision-making. The opinion of the public is 
another parameter which needs to be incorporated when analysing the interest of the political 
parties. The analysis has not included such effect and the project is thus limited from discussing 
the tension between the inter-institutional interest of the Parliament and the effect of the public 
interests. The empirical research further establishes that the behaviour of and the relationship 
between the parties may be explained by ideological similarity, technical reasons and collective 
interest. The effect of the interest of the Parliament as a whole to the political parties was a focal 
point of the analysis and the theoretical interpretation is that the party groups will value 
influence over ideological positions, which empirical to some degree is supported. However the 
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empirical research also establishes that ideological similarity does affect the structure of 
competition and collusion. The analysis further suggested that the structure of both the formal 
and informal institutional practises would be structured as to enhance the level of influence of 
the larger political parties; however this was in the analysis challenged by the tradition of 
dividing parliamentary seats due to size of political parties.  Hix et al. argue that the groups of 
the EPP and PES do not collude to by-pass the smaller political parties (2003: 318-322). 
However, the effect is none-the-less, according to Hix, that when competition is structured 
between EPP, PES and ELDR the smaller parties are effectively shut out (Gabel and Hix, 2002: 
953 & Hix 1999:91).  
 
In general the empirical research supports the interpretation that the collective interest of the 
Parliament affects the behaviour of and relationship between the political groups. However, the 
overall pattern is that to understand the political behaviour one needs to include several 
parameters and not only the formal and informal inter- and intra-institutional practises within 
the procedure of co-decision.  
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7. Conclusion  
 
The aim of the project was to establish the effect of the procedure of co-decision to the 
behaviour of and relationship between the political groups of the Parliament and furthermore 
discuss the effect to the inter-institutional operating of the Parliament within the process of 
decision-making with the Council and Commission. The effect was established by the 
application of the theory of rational choice institutionalism where after the main theoretical 
interpretations were discussed to the empirical research of the intra-institutional process of 
decision-making in the Parliament.  
 
The theoretical interpretation suggests that the formal structures of the procedure of co-decision 
favour the larger political parties due to the ability of the parties to influence the institutional 
structure of the procedure. It is however found that the procedure in reality do not favour the 
larger political parties as much as expected. The tradition of balancing the distribution of rights 
and powers according to the size of the parties and the further construction of the Conciliation 
committee system to ensure that the delegation of chairs of committees can not be made used of 
to ensure more inter-institutional influence reflect this. Yet, the procedure is interpreted to affect 
the behaviour of the political groups as to enhance cooperating instead of competition. The 
Parliament has fought hard for its current legislative status and it is interpreted that it is not 
viable that the political parties will act as to jeopardize the legislative status. However, when 
focusing on the formal rules of voting, the procedure of co-decision does not affect the political 
parties differently. None the less, when considering the effect of further readings, the theoretical 
interpretation is that the procedure of co-decision does affect the parties differently than other 
legislative procedures. The extension of the procedure ensures that the parties both have 
readings to pursue party interests and further have readings to balance the interest of the party to 
the interest of the Parliament as a whole.   
Turning to the informal practises of the procedure of co-decision it is found that the informal 
practises do not favour the larger political parties in particular and the rules structuring the 
informal practises are thus equal to the formal rules of the procedure of co-decision. The 
theoretical interpretation suggesting that the rules structuring the informal bargaining should 
favour the larger political parties is thus challenged by the rules guiding the day-to-day 
decision-making of the Parliament.  However, the dynamic between the formal and informal 
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practises may affect the parties differently, according to the theoretical interpretation of the 
interests of the political parties. The introduction of informal practises may be utilized to pursue 
own ideological interests; however another theoretical interpretation is also that the informal 
practises may be utilized to ensure influence of the Parliament because of the level of 
uncertainty of the further formal process.  
 
Taking all of the interpretations into consideration one may argue that a balanced Parliament 
may be stronger and more influential than a marginalized and conflicting Parliament. Member 
States representatives of the Parliament feeling by-passed may affect the representatives in the 
Council to ensure that a legislative act in question is not adopted in the Council and thus ensure 
that the larger political parties can not take advantage of their parliamentary size. Influence may 
thus be valued higher than political outcome and the theoretical interpretation and the effect of 
the procedure may be that the political parties perceive the Parliament stronger united than in 
conflict. Hence, the larger political parties do not have an advantage in structuring the 
Parliament as to their individual interests and instead all of the political parties seek to ensure 
parliamentary influence in the inter-institutional decision-making through cooperation. The 
influence may be of a formal character when the Council discusses adopting the amendments of 
the Parliament to a legislative act, when the Parliament and the Council negotiate for a joint text 
in the Conciliation committee and of an informal character when the Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission engage in informal bargaining.  
 
The empirical research supports the later interpretation of effect of the procedure to the 
behaviour of and relationship between the political parties. However, the overall pattern is that 
to understand the political behaviour one needs to include several parameters and not only the 
formal and informal inter- and intra-institutional practises within the procedure of co-decision. 
Such parameters are for instance the public opinion, ideological similarity and technical reasons.  
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9. Illustration of the procedure of co-decision: 1st reading 
 
             
 
Legal basis:  
Article 250(2) EC Treaty; Article 251(1) and (2) EC Treaty; EP Rules of Procedure Rules 34-53, 
131, 185 ; Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the co-decision procedure: 2007/C 
145/02 
Commission 
initiates a proposal  
EP comes with an 
opinion and 
amendments – 
adopted by a simple 
majority 
EP has no 
amendments   
EP has no 
amendments  
Commission 
incorporates the 
amendments and 
forward to the 
Council 
Council adopts the 
proposal  
The act is adopted 
Council rejects the 
amendments and 
adopts a Common 
Position 
The proposal is 
forwarded to the 
Council which 
accept without any 
alterations  
The proposal is 
adopted  
The Council rejects 
the proposal and 
adopts a Common 
Position  
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The procedure of co-decision: 2nd reading of the EP 
   
              
 
Legal basis:  
Article 251(2) EC Treaty; EP Rules of Procedure rule 57, 61, 62 and 67 
The EP may extend the procedure with one month: Article 251(7) EC Treaty and EP Rules of 
Procedure rule 58 
Commission 
supports or opposes 
the Common 
Position of the 
Council 
Within the three 
months time limit 
the EP: fails to take 
a decision (by 
absolute majority) or 
endorses the CP as it 
stands 
Within the three 
months time limit 
the EP: rejects the 
CP by an absolute 
majority 
Within the three 
months time limit 
the EP: proposes 
amendments by an 
absolute majority  
 
The CP is adopted  
The act is not 
adopted and the 
procedure is ended 
Commission gives 
its opinion to the 
proposed 
amendments offered 
by the EP 
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The procedure of co-decision: the 2nd reading of the Council  
 
 
 
Legal basis:  
Article 251 (2) (3) and (4) EC Treaty; Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the co-
decision procedure: 2007/C 145/02 
The Commission 
gives it opinion to 
the amendments of 
the EP 
Within three 
months if negative 
opinion: The 
Council adopts the 
amendments by 
unanimous vote 
Within three 
months if positive 
opinion: The 
Council adopts the 
amendments by a 
qualified majority  
Within three months: 
Regardless of positive 
or negative opinion: 
The Council fail to 
approve amendments 
or merely reject them 
The CP is adopted  The CP is adopted  Convening of the 
Conciliation 
Committee within 
six weeks 
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The procedure of co-decision: The Convening of the Conciliation Committee  
 
  
Legal basis: 
Article 251 (4) and (5) EC Treaty; Joint Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the co-
decision  Procedure: 2007/C 145/02  
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/stepbystep/diagram_en.htm 
Convening of 
the Conciliation 
Committee 
within six 
weeks 
 
 
The Committee 
produces a joint 
text 
The text is adopted by 
qualified majority of 
the Council and simple 
majority in the EP 
The act is 
adopted 
The text is not 
adopted by one 
or both 
institutions  
The procedure 
is ended and 
no act is 
adopted 
The Committee 
does not 
produce a joint 
text 
The procedure 
is ended and no 
act is adopted 
